Sign langauge and hate speech: The potential pitfalls of iconic signs by Carney, Terrence R
  
02 September 2019
Ansie van der Westhuizen 
Non-Commercial Digital Developer 
Collection Development Division 
Unisa Library 
Email: vdwesapj@unisa.ac.za 
Phone: +27 12 4293426 
Dear ms van der Westhuizen 
LETTER OF CONSENT FOR ARCHIVING ON UNISA INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORY (UNISAIR) 
I, Johannes Lodewikus van Zyl hereby grant my permission for the archiving of the following item 
written by Unisa staff in the UnisaIR: 
 Title of publication: New Frontiers in Forensic Linguistics: Themes and Perspectives in Language 
and Law in Africa and Beyond. Stellenbosch: AFRICAN SUN MEDIA, 279-300.  
 Editor/s: Ralarala, MK; Kaschula, RH & Heydon, G (eds.). 
 Chapter/article title: Sign language and hate speech: The potential pitfalls of iconic signs.  
 Chapter / article pages: Chapter 14 ; Pp 279-300.  
 Author/s of chapter/article: Carney, TR (2019). 
 ISBN/ISSN: (ISBN-13: 978-1-928480-16-7, ISBN-13: 978-1-928480-17-4 (e-book)). 
Conditions (if any) for archiving above mentioned item/s in UnisaIR: 
 The published version will be provided for upload to UnisaIR 
 The PDF contains a complete reference to the original publication 
 The DOI link to the complete publication is: https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480174  
I understand that the UnisaIR is an open digital research repository located on the website of the 
University of South Africa at http://uir.unisa.ac.za.  
 2   
 
I am authorized to give this permission. 
Kind regards 
 
_____________________________ 
WIKUS VAN ZYL 
PUBLISHING MANAGER 
T: 021 201 0071 
wikus@africansunmedia.co.za  
279
14SIGN LANGUAGE AND  HATE SPEECHThe potential pitfalls of iconic signs
Terrence R. Carney
Introduction
The naming of things is a powerful act. The one who names objects exercises a certain 
amount of influence. Bosmajian (1974) reminds his readers that to receive a name elevates 
an individual to the status of being human; to be without a name leaves one’s identity 
questionable. Having a good name is so important to the individual that society has called 
for defamation laws to protect a person from name-calling. The power of naming is related 
to the defining of others. In following Edward Sapir, Bosmajian (1974) recalls that people’s 
thoughts affect their language and their language affects their thoughts. There is a link 
between the way people see (and speak of ) themselves and the way they view others. As 
Bosmajian (1974:5) puts it: “Our identities, who and what we are, how others see us, are 
greatly affected by the names we are called and the words with which we are labelled”. 
Name-calling is not simply about giving someone a bad reputation; it relates directly to 
othering. The sender reminds the receiver that he or she is not like the sender and, as a 
result, inferior (see also Wolfson, 1997). It is here that a distinction can be made between 
affecting one’s reputation and professional character on the one hand and demeaning one’s 
self-worth and self-image on the other. The former deals with slander and libel and the 
latter addresses hate speech.
Though the term is considered by some to be imprecise and difficult to define (McGonagle, 
2011; Parekh 2012), “hate speech” can be described as derogatory language directed mostly 
at minority groups (Bhatia, 2016; Wolfson, 1997). It includes a wide range of negative 
discourse (McGonagle, 2011) that ultimately leads to a break in peace (Trager & Dickerson, 
1999) and damages core values like inclusiveness and dignity (Bhatia, 2016; Wolfson, 1997). 
Hate speech has historic ties with freedom of speech, freedom of religion and immigration 
(Walker, 1994). Contact between different peoples created a need to protect religious 
beliefs, cultural practices and linguistic rights and has led to the existence of in-groups 
and out-groups and, with it, a vocabulary. Parekh (2016:40) says hate speech “expresses, 
encourages, stirs up, or incites hatred against a group of individuals distinguished by a 
particular feature or set of features such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, 
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and sexual orientation”. Parekh (2016:40-41) continues by identifying three features of 
hate speech:
(1) it is directed at an individual or group based on arbitrary and irrelevant features;
(2) it stigmatises the target group by ascribing undesirable qualities to that group; and 
(3) due to its negative qualities, the target group is considered unwelcome and consequently 
a threat to the stability of society.
Ultimately, hate speech is communication that is offensive, hurtful and wounding (Trager 
& Dickerson, 1999), it causes emotional distress and leaves victims “threatened, humiliated 
and diminished” (Wolfson, 1997:47). It furthermore perpetuates stereotypes and mistrust.
The presence of social media has proven to be an ideal platform for the survival of hate 
speech. A case in point was when, much to her surprise, an estate agent from Durban 
became a household name in South Africa after she referred to black beachgoers as 
“monkeys” on Facebook (Evans, 2016). Penny Sparrow’s Facebook post spread like wildfire. 
She made things worse when she tried to defend herself by saying that she was merely 
stating the facts (Wicks, 2016). Though not an isolated incident, it would become the 
archetype of hate speech on social media in South Africa. The public became increasingly 
aware of individuals spewing hatred through social media, affecting all cultures: a black man 
claiming he wanted to kill white and Indian people and rape their children (Pijoos, 2017); 
a white man who was unhappy with the Ministry of Sport and reverted to calling officials 
“a bunch of k*****s” (Davis, 2017); a Christian who was tired of “Muslim bastards” and 
their call to prayer (News24, 2017); a straight woman who called a gay editor a “faggot 
with a mouth” (Mamba Online, 2018); and a variety of people writing hateful things about 
the Chinese after illegal trade in donkey skins became public knowledge (Raborife, 2017). 
Matters got worse when individuals in more respected professions made themselves guilty 
of hate speech through social media: government officials (Velaphi Khumalo), university 
lecturers (Benny Morota), parliamentarians (Dianne Kohler Barnard) and even city mayors 
(Herman Mashaba) incited racial and xenophobic hatred (Davis, 2017; Etheridge, 2016).
Since 1994, many incidents like the examples mentioned have led to Parliament first 
promulgating the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
in 2000 (the Equality Act), followed recently by the tabling by Cabinet of the Prevention 
and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (the Hate Speech Bill). The much-
awaited Bill was first published for public comment in October 2016 and soon came under 
attack as being somewhat vague, containing broad definitions that might pose a threat 
to freedom in general and lead to the unreasonable incarceration of well-intentioned 
individuals (Griffin, 2017; Free Market Foundation, 2017; Wasserman, 2017). Furthermore, 
the Bill seems rather redundant in light of the Equality Act and the Constitution, which 
already deal with discriminatory concerns like hate speech (Dube, 2017; Griffin, 2017; 
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Wasserman, 2017). The Bill was subsequently revised and a second version was published 
in the Government Gazette of 29 March 2018.
When studying the social media examples cited above, as well as case law dealing with 
hate speech, it appears that identity signifiers lie at the heart of it. The following, amongst 
others, are mostly at the core of transgressions:
 • race (Donaldo v Haripersad; M v Ferreira; Khoza v Saeed; Magubane v Smith; ANC v Sparrow; 
Smith v Mgoqi; Herselman v Geleba);
 • religion (Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncom Media Investments Ltd; Islamic Unity 
Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority);
 • gender (Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema); and
 • sexual orientation (South African Human Rights Commission v Qwulane).
Having legislation in place to prevent and act upon instances of hate speech (and other 
means of discrimination) is a necessity in each country, especially within nations that have 
suffered under an oppressive government where identity politics now remains an important 
issue. However, to what extent does legislation like the Equality Act and the Hate Speech 
Bill succeed in being a successful tool in combating these transgressions? Hate speech is 
often only considered in its verbal form. It is usually something that is said, sung or written 
down. But what about other forms of hate speech? For instance, how would courts deal 
with the use of symbols or accusations of discrimination in visual-spatial languages?
In an introductory sign language course, I became aware of lexis that I – as a hearing, 
nonsigning person – immediately thought of as politically incorrect (un-PC). Though the 
instructor insisted that these terms were acceptable within the specified Deaf community, 
it did make me wonder how many signs could be understood as offensive or even hateful. 
Initially, I looked up a number of these signs in the Dictionary of South African Signs (Penn, 
Ogilvy-Foreman, Simmons & Anderson-Forbes, 1992-1994) to confirm whether they were 
listed and whether the dictionary mentioned anything about them being derogatory. They 
were indeed lemmatised1 and contained no warning labels. Considering the seriousness 
of hate speech and the qualifying criteria provided for in legislation, what would a signing 
Deaf person’s position be if accused? Three related questions come to mind:
 • To what extent do iconic signs qualify as hate speech?
 • In what way do iconic signs qualify as hate speech when observed by hearing nonsigners?
 • How sufficient are the definitions and criteria in the Equality Act and the Hate Speech Bill 
to address hate speech transgressions in sign language?
For the following discussion, this chapter is divided into three main sections. To start, 
the focus will fall on gestures, iconicity and socially unacceptable signs. Subsequently, an 
overview will be provided of what the Equality Act and the Hate Speech Bill say about hate 
1 A ‘lemma’ being the headword/main entry in a dictionary.
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speech. The chapter will then proceed to discuss the questions previously mentioned in 
relation to the legislation.
Lexis in sign language
Gesturing
Most hearing people use silent or co-speech gestures that have been conventionalised by 
their culture at some time (Baker, Van den Bogaerde, Pfau & Schermer, 2016:10; Perniss, 
Özyürek & Morgan, 2015). It is generally a visual adumbration in the communication 
process, which may happen unwittingly (Perniss et al., 2015:6), for example, using your 
index finger to point at something when saying “Look over there”. In South Africa, when 
you want the bill at a restaurant, you can catch your waiter’s eye and gesture as if you are 
either writing in the air or writing on the palm of your hand. When indicating to someone 
at a distance from you that you will phone them, you place your hand next to your ear, with 
thumb and little finger extended to mimic the receiver of a phone. One of the universal 
signs for “good” is a clenched fist with a thumb raised upwards, whereas drinking is usually 
a hand in the shape of a vessel brought towards the mouth and then tipped (sometimes 
repetitively). In addition, when quoting someone while talking, people tend to draw 
inverted commas in the air (sometimes only with one hand).
Of course, as with spoken language, gestures are present in sign language, but they do not 
necessarily qualify as signs. For a gesture to qualify as a sign, it has to adhere to the four 
parameters of sign language – and always in relation to the signing space (see Fourie Blair, 
2013:116-119; Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap, 2000:408-409):
 • handshape
 • location
 • movement, and
 • orientation
Handshape is used to give form to a sign. There are many different handshapes, like a Flat 
Hand, a B Hand, a Bent Flat Hand, and so on. Location is measured against the hand or 
position of the hands in relation to the body: hands are close to or far from the body, or 
they are kept in the middle, or on the periphery of the signing space. The third parameter 
is the type of movement for which the hand is used to articulate meaning. Orientation 
determines the position of the hand palm: when signing, the palm faces different directions, 
either away from the signer, or up and down, or facing the signer. All signs obey the four 
parameters, though gestures do not. For example, the South African Sign Language (SASL) 
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verb “know” (Figure 14.1)2 is a bent flat hand (handshape) with the palm facing downward 
(orientation), fingers touching (movement) the side of the head (location), repetitively 
(Baker et al., 2016:70).
FIGURE 14.1     Know in South African Sign Language 
 (Reproduced with permission)
Gesturing to someone that you will phone him or her (as described) does not have to adhere 
to movement or location in the same way a sign does. The speaker usually determines how 
far away he or she wants to place the hand from the ear and there is no fixed rule as to the 
orientation of the palm. Gesturing is often about the message conveyed and not so much 
the syntax that governs it. The signing space, however, consists of the area starting above 
the head and reaching the middle of the body; signs are made on, or close to, the body and 
seldom outside this space (Baker et al., 2016:2-3).
Arbitrary and iconic signs
In the same way as in spoken languages, sign language distinguishes between arbitrary and 
iconic signs. Arbitrary signs show no obvious relation between the sign and its meaning. 
The noun in SASL representing the gloss “name” (Figure 14.2) bears no clear resemblance 
to the concept of naming.
2 All the illustrations of signs published in this chapter are used with the permission of Mr G. Maluleka of the Unisa 
Sound, Video and Photography Unit.
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FIGURE 14.2  Name in South African Sign Language 
(Reproduced with permission)
Iconic signs, on the other hand, show an apparent relation between form and meaning 
(Baker et al., 2016:37; Meir, 2010:874; Russo, 2004:167). A good example of iconicity in spoken 
language are the features onomatopoeia, phonesthesia and ideophone (Meir, 2010:866; 
Ortega, Sümer & Özyürek, 2014:1114; Perniss, Thompson & Vigliocco, 2010:2-3; Russo, 
2004:165-166, 168). Words ranging from “meow” to “knock” and “buzz” are all examples of 
sound having a bearing on meaning. In addition to depicting the characteristics of an entity 
or action, Ortega et al. (2014:1114) point out that iconic signs may also indicate the motion 
patterns and the spatial relations between objects, and they can represent either the entity 
or action in part or entirely. Perniss et al. (2010:8) argue that both spoken and sign language 
users are aware of iconicity and make use of it deliberately. However, the occurrence of 
iconicity is much more prevalent in sign language than in spoken languages, mostly because 
they convey concepts through a spatial-visual modality (Meir, 2010:866, 871; Ortega et al., 
2014:1115; Perniss et al., 2010:4). Tolar, Lederberg, Gokhale and Tomasello (2007:225) 
state that iconic signs are so prevalent because “individuals can interpret them without 
requiring a prior explicit connection between them and their referents”. Some signs are only 
partially iconic, which means that not all of the components of form correspond with the 
components of meaning (Meir, 2010:873-874). Iconic signs are therefore either transparent 
or non-transparent.
Transparent iconic signs represent the visual aspects of an entity or action in such a way 
that its meaning becomes easily deducible, even for hearing nonsigners (Baker et al., 
2016:37; Lieberth & Gamble, 1991:89; Tolar et al., 2007:226). An experiment by Lieberth 
and Gamble (1991) found that not only do sign-naive people understand and remember 
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many transparent iconic signs, they also have success in identifying them. Examples in 
SASL include the glosses “baby” (holding it in your arms, Figure 14.3a), “hot” (wiping sweat 
from your forehead, Figure 14.3b) and “sleep” (Figure 14.3c).
(a) Baby (b) Hot (c) Sleep
FIGURE 14.3  Transparent iconic signs in South African Sign Language 
(Reproduced with permission)
Even though some signs may have been quite transparent when they were first introduced, 
they have become less transparent over time and therefore the relation between the sign 
and the feature of the action or entity is no longer that clear (Meir, 2010:866; Perniss et al., 
2010:5). Examples in SASL include “washing” (of clothes, Figure 14.4a), which mimics the 
rubbing of cloth between two hands; and “coffee”, which mimics the grinding of coffee 
beans (Figure 14.4b).
(a) Washing (b) Coffee
FIGURE 14.4   Non-transparent iconic signs in South African Sign Language 
(Reproduced with permission)
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Just as signs are influenced by a variety of demographic factors like race, ethnicity, age, 
region and schooling, iconic signs are also determined by culture (Lieberth & Gamble, 1991; 
McKee & McKee, 2011). Similar to spoken language, differences in culture and subculture 
lead to sign variety (Aarons & Akach, 1998; Penn, Lewis & Greenstein, 1984:7-8; Woll & 
Ladd, 2003:160). Even if someone knows the form of a certain sign, that is no guarantee 
that he or she will understand its meaning (Russo, 2004:171-172). The sign for “cat” in 
American Sign Language (ASL) is indicated by using one hand to pull at a single whisker, 
whereas British Sign Language (BSL) uses both hands to indicate all the cat’s whiskers (see 
Perniss et al., 2010:5).
Researchers have proven that Deaf children who speak sign language as their mother tongue 
do not find iconic signs easier to acquire than arbitrary signs (Lieberth & Gamble, 1991:90; 
Meir, 2010:867; Ortega et al., 2014:1115-1116; Tolar et al., 2007:226). They follow the same 
process for most signs when learning vocabulary. That being said, both Deaf and hearing 
older children and adults learn iconic signs much more quickly and are able to retain them 
in long term memory because they can relate the sign to the visual characteristics of the 
original referent (Lieberth & Gamble, 1991:90; Tolar et al., 2007:234). Many of these iconic 
signs are related to what Padden, Hwang, Lepic and Seegers (2015) call instrument and 
handling strategies. They found that iconic signs for objects are often connected to the 
way an instrument is shaped and used. The handling strategy involves the grasping of an 
imaginary tool and moving the hand(s) in a manner similar to how they would move when 
the object is used; whereas the instrument strategy usually shows the shape and dimension 
of the object in a motion typical of that tool in use (Padden et al., 2015:82-83). Identity 
signifiers are indicated by both action- and feature-based iconicity. Some identities relate to 
dynamic physical attributes (e.g. certain jobs, handicaps), whereas others depend on static 
physical features (wearing a Roman collar, or a bindi on the forehead).
Politically incorrect signs
Sign language is no different to spoken language when it comes to socially unacceptable or 
politically incorrect language. As Sutton-Spence and Woll (1999:242) point out, a younger 
generation may take offence to older signs, though the older generation may find no fault in 
the words they use. An example of this is the un-PC gloss “persons with disability” in BSL 
(Figure 14.5), which focuses on walking impairment.
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FIGURE 14.5  Person(s) with disability in British Sign Language 
(Reproduced with permission)
This is not to be confused with coarse or taboo language or even insults. Taboo language may 
include references to sex or religion and may leave conversational partners uncomfortable 
or embarrassed. Coarse language includes words like “bitch” or “fucker” and is used as an 
interjection to express emotional states. Insults are meant to degrade someone, usually by 
pointing at certain physical features and making fun of them, for instance, calling someone 
“four eyes” when they wear glasses. Though all of these may be socially unacceptable and 
may no doubt form part of hate speech, politically incorrect language is most relevant here. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2018) defines political incorrectness as “discriminatory” 
and the opposite of social appropriateness. Sutton-Spence and Woll (1999:249) describe 
politically correct (PC) signs as “those that have been changed especially because it is feared 
that the [former] sign will offend someone”, causing insult without meaning to. Due to 
pejorative connotations, sign language communities have started to change signs that may be 
viewed as un-PC. This may be related to increasing social contact on linguistic and cultural 
levels, as well as changes taking place due to socio-economic and socio-political needs of a 
younger generation (see Aarons & Akach, 1998; McKee & McKee, 2011). Examples in BSL 
include new signs for the glosses “Jew” and “India”. Instead of using the iconic sign depicting 
a hooked nose or beard to gloss “Jew”, the menorah is used instead (Sutton-Spence & Woll, 
1999:250-251). For India, an arbitrary sign replaces the imagined bindi (red dot on the 
forehead) (Mickelburgh & Syal, 2004). Reasons for these changes came about in different 
ways. Explicit changes in BSL, for instance, include interventions applied by a television 
programme for the Deaf (Mickelburgh & Syal, 2004). Several older signs were dropped 
by the TV station because they were deemed inappropriate (Mickleburgh & Syal, 2004). 
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The proposed changes were initially met with resistance by some members in the Deaf 
community as interference in Deaf language and culture (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004). 
However, the results of a survey across the United Kingdom in 2012 has since confirmed 
that users of BSL have replaced several signs (like “China”, “gay”, “Jew” and “India”) to reflect 
social changes and attitudes within British society (Guardian, 2012; Silverman, 2012).
Many signs that are potentially un-PC are still customary in sign languages across the 
world and in some varieties of SASL (Mickelburgh & Syal, 2004). Dutch (NGT), Flemish 
(VGT), ASL and Afrikaans sign language (AGT) use a depiction of a bindi on the forehead 
to gloss “Hindu”/“India”.3 ASL uses eye shape to gloss “Chinese” and “Japanese”. NGT, ASL, 
VGT and Austrian Sign Language (ÖGS) use an iconic depiction of a beard to gloss “Jew”.4 
Dutch sign language previously glossed “Jew” by referring to a hooked nose, but now uses a 
beard depiction as well (Baker et al., 2016:295). Along with an iconic representation of side 
curls (the payot), the beard depiction is considered less awkward. Nevertheless, these signs 
remain exclusively masculine and therefore continue to be problematic. AGT and VGT still 
refer to Jewishness through the stereotypical hooked nose (Figure 14.6).
Front Profile
FIGURE 14.6  Jew in Afrikaans and Flemish Sign Language 
(Reproduced with permission) 
Other contentious signs include iconic depictions of the hijab to gloss “Morocco” (NGT); 
iconic hand-over-mouth ululating to gloss “Native American” (VGT) (Figure 14.7); non-
transparent iconic references to the African nose to gloss “Africa” (ASL); and an iconic flick 
of the wrist to denote gay people (“homo” – NGT). To gloss “walking frame”, speakers of 
NGT use both hands to place the imagined instrument in front of them to denote walking, 
while bobbing their heads to indicate old age. Some users of SASL articulate “persons with 
3 Dutch examples are taken from the Basiswoordenboek Nederlandse Gebarentaal (Schermer & Koolhof, 2009); 
Flemish examples from Vlaamse Gebarentaal Woordenboek (Van Herreweeghe, Slembrouck & Vermeerbergen, 
2004); ASL examples from Signing Savvy’s Sign Language Dictionary (2018); and the SASL examples from the 
Dictionary of Southern African Signs (Penn et al., 1993;1994).
4 Austrian examples are taken from Zentrum für Gebärdensprache und Hörbehindertenkommunikation’s Leda 
Sila (2017).
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disability” by contracting the arms into crooked positions, recalling a disabled person’s 
mangled body.
FIGURE 14.7  Native American in Flemish Sign Sign Language 
(Reproduced with permission)
These and other iconic identity signifiers that correspond with prohibited grounds of South 
African legislation could be experienced by others as hateful or harmful.
The Equality Act and Hate Speech Bill
Most countries have laws prohibiting hate speech in one way or another (Trager & 
Dickerson, 1999; Walker, 1994). South Africa is no exception. Legislation addressing hate 
speech in South Africa should be read together with Section 16 of the Constitution, which 
provides for the freedom of speech. However, freedom of expression is not extended to 
propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, or the advocacy of hatred based on 
race, ethnicity, gender or religion, which would cause harm. In addition, the Equality Act 
is meant to give effect to the spirit of the South African Constitution, to promote equality, 
and to correct what the apartheid regime has damaged through its discriminatory policies 
(Section 4(2)). The Act (Section 6) is also very clear in that neither the state nor any person 
may discriminate unfairly against any other person. Section 10 of the Act declares in no 
uncertain terms what South African citizens should refrain from doing if they want to steer 
clear of hate speech. Subject to a proviso in Section 12, no person may publish, propagate, 
advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds listed 
in the Act against any person that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear 
intention to be hurtful, harmful or incite harm, and promote or propagate hatred.
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A court furthermore has the authority to refer a case to the Director of Public Prosecutions 
to institute criminal proceedings against an individual. Guilty parties have had to pay 
penalties or do community service as penance for their crime (Geldenhuys, 2017:25; 
Sethusa, 2014; SAPA, 2014).5
In their critique of the Act’s hate speech provisions, Marais and Pretorius (2015:907) argue 
that the term “words” in Section  10(1) (“advocate or communicate words”) should be 
replaced by the term “expression” and should, by extension, include the concept “symbolic 
expression” to cover more examples of hate speech. In their view, “expression” must then 
include vandalism of state symbols like the national flag (Marais & Pretorius, 2015:907).6 
However, the shortcomings of the Act do not stop here. The Act does not define what it 
signifies by the terms “publish”, “propagate”, “advocate” or “communicate”. This means that 
these terms could be understood to include all manner of language output, regardless of 
the medium or channel of communication – public or private; signs produced through sign 
language are then no exception.
The prohibited grounds, mentioned in Section 1(xxii) of the Act, are quite exhaustive and 
include the following:
(a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth; 
or
(b) any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground –
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage;
(ii) undermines human dignity; or
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a 
serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a).
Of equal importance is Section  13, which deals with the burden of proof. It is the 
respondent’s duty to prove that unfair discrimination did not take place as alleged. In other 
words, the respondent has to prove that his or her words did not contravene any of the 
prohibited grounds and that there was no clear intention to be either hurtful or harmful. 
If, however, it can be proved that discrimination did take place, then the respondent needs 
to demonstrate that the discrimination was fair. The responsibility clearly lies with the 
speaker/signer and not the listener/looker. Another important aspect is the fact that hurt 
or harm does not need to be present for speech to be seen as hate speech, as long as the 
potential to be hurtful or harmful is present.
5 Vicki Momberg became the first person in South Africa to receive a prison sentence for hate speech. However, the 
fairness and harshness of the sentence and her treatment by the presiding officer has been criticised (Saunderson-
Meyer, 2018).
6 In a similar vein, the Nelson Mandela Foundation (2018) has approached the Equality Court with a request to have 
the public display of the old South African flag declared as a form of hate speech.
MK Ralarala, RH Kaschula & G Heydon (eds). 2019. New Frontiers in Forensic Linguistics. Stellenbosch: SUN PReSS
© 2019 AFRICAN SUN MeDIA
291
 Sign language and hate speech 
For instance, this means that if someone takes offence to the use of an iconic sign that 
glosses “Jew”, it becomes the signer’s responsibility to argue that he or she was not being 
intentionally hurtful or harmful and that the sign is the only one to denote Jewishness 
within that particular sign language dialect. However, this could be a tough argument to 
sell, seeing as this is not only a matter of intention, but also of the potential to be hurtful 
and or harmful (see also Botha and Govindjee, 2014:149-150; Teichner, 2003:354). Add to 
this any effect the iconic sign might have on the accuser’s human dignity, and it becomes 
increasingly difficult for a signer to prove his or her innocence. There is also the issue of 
perpetuating a stereotype, which might cause trouble further down the line.
Unfortunately, the fact that a word or sign should only be proven to be potentially damaging 
creates enough space for individuals to pursue personal vendettas, leaving the accused 
parties with the burden of proving their innocence. “Potential” as a criterion of hate speech 
also undermines the spirit and goal of the Act.
The goals of the Hate Speech Bill are similar to those of the Equality Act and mention 
human dignity, equality and, especially, non-racialism. The second version of the Bill 
defines “communication” as any “display; written, illustrated, visual or other descriptive 
matter; oral statement; representation or reference; or an electronic communication”.7 
Almost identical to the Equality Act’s description, “Hate speech” is defined by the Bill in 
Section 4(1) as follows:
(a) Any person who intentionally publishes, propagates or advocates anything or 
communicates to one or more persons in a manner that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to –
(i) be harmful or incite harm; or
(ii) promote or propagate hatred.
To qualify as an offence of hate speech, the intended communication has to be based on one 
or more of the following grounds: age; albinism; birth; colour; culture; disability; ethnicity 
or social origin; gender or gender identity; HIV status; language; nationality, migrant 
or refugee status; race; religion; and sex, which includes intersex or sexual orientation. 
Subsections (b) and (c) extend the definition of hate speech to explicitly include electronic 
forms of communication and the display and distribution of any material that corresponds 
with its definition in Subsection (a). Interestingly, Section 4(1) of the Bill makes it clear 
that hate speech is not something that only occurs between a sender and an intended 
receiver: it also applies to a communication that is accessible by any member of the public. 
Potentially, this means that person A can direct his or her message at person B, but the 
reaction of anyone else who decodes this message will also be considered valid. This is 
7 Interestingly, the first version of the Bill also included the word “gesture” in its definition of “communication”, which 
could have been used to address visual-spatial transgressions.
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already visible in Rustenburg Platinum Mine v SAEWA obo Bester and Others, in which 
the Constitutional Court not only considered the reaction of the intended receiver of the 
contested message, but also the reactions of the people who were present where the verbal 
exchange took place.
At first, the Bill’s definition of “communication” seems inclusive and broad enough to include 
every possible type of communication. However, the definition fails to explain precisely 
what communication is; instead it lists types of communication without elaborating on what 
each type means. For instance, where would the use or abuse of a state symbol like a flag be 
categorised? Visual communication? Display? Representation? What about sign language? 
Should a court classify it under “visual communication”, “representation”, “demonstration” 
(which is not included in the list) or “descriptive matter”? What exactly is meant by 
“electronic communication”? Does it simply refer to the channel of communication, or 
would it include language elements like emojis? Maybe emojis would be classified under 
“illustrated”, “display”, “descriptive matter” or “representation”. What about braille? Does it 
qualify as “written communication”? The same level of vagueness is present in the use, in 
Subsection 4(1)(c), of the words “any material”. How is “any material” different to the list of 
items included in the definition of “communication”?
Criticism is not restricted to the Bill; the Equality Act has not been spared either. The 
Act has been criticised for similar reasons – being too vague and too broad (see Marais, 
2015:471; Marais & Pretorius, 2015; Teichner, 2003). Even its complex legalese has been 
analysed and found challenging (Nienaber, 2002). However, the Act too provides enough 
to include sign language in what qualifies as a communication exchange. In the end, it 
all comes down to a signifier and its signified; the use of a sign (in the semiotic sense) to 
communicate a concept. This incorporates both aural-oral and visual-spatial language.
Discussion
This section will briefly consider how each of the questions posed at the start of the chapter 
engage with the criteria in the cited legislation:
To what extent do iconic signs qualify as hate speech?8
Considering that sign language is a legitimate language like any other, there should be no 
exceptions. If a hearing speaker could be guilty of hate speech based on the words he or 
she uses, then a signing Deaf person could be, too. Considering also the criteria in both 
the Act and the Bill that clearly provide for visual communication, signs that communicate 
8 A search on the Juta Law Online Publications database for reported cases dealing with sign language related to 
hate speech delivered no results.
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meaning could get a signer into trouble. Like words, signs are the containers for conceptual 
meaning. If that meaning is construed as being hateful, harmful, or aids in propagating 
(and perpetuating) hatred amongst people, then that specific sign and the context in which 
it was used should be scrutinised. If a signer is aware that a specific sign could be offensive 
to others, and he or she knows there are other signs to communicate the same concept and 
yet he or she continues to use this sign, then the user’s sign choice creates the potential to 
propagate and perpetuate hatred.
In the first instance of the Afriforum v Malema case, Justice Bertelsmann said (par. 10, 
and further), that the true yardstick of hate speech is neither the historical significance nor 
the context of a phrase like “kill the boer”, but rather “the effect of the words, objectively 
considered upon those directly affected and targeted thereby”. This also means that a group 
of speakers cannot claim that a certain word or sign is acceptable just because they use it. 
Claiming that an iconic sign (like hand-over-mouth ululation to gloss “Native American”) is 
suitable due to a lack of a more appropriate sign or due to token frequency, would be a weak 
argument. The Herselman v Geleba case is proof that the Equality Court is unsympathetic 
to references of culture and linguistic expression (as defence strategy), even when these are 
nuanced enough to make a difference in the verdict. When the appellant tried to argue that 
his use of the word bobbejaan was not meant in a racist manner, but rather used within a 
common Afrikaans expression indicating that someone was being silly, the court dismissed 
this view and sided with the original plaintiff.
Logically, this is not restricted to iconic signs only. Arbitrary signs that have developed a 
politically incorrect denotation or reference may cause the same damage. However, iconic 
identity signifiers are easier for Deaf and hearing people to infer, especially when they are 
based on physical attributes. Dehumanising someone or making that person feel inferior is 
what the Act and the Bill are trying to combat, regardless of the medium of communication 
(see also Teichner, 2003:355, 357).
Iconic signs as observed by hearing nonsigners
In what way do iconic signs qualify as hate speech when observed by hearing nonsigners? 
This depends primarily on whether the nonsigning person is able to interpret the contested 
transparent iconic sign. As the literature review has shown, hearing individuals can identify 
and understand certain transparent signs even if they do not understand sign language. 
However, this situation could also create many misunderstandings. An onlooker may 
think he or she understands the sign language observed, but unless they ask to confirm 
what the signer meant by a specific sign, a hearing nonsigning person might never really 
know. It is somewhat unlikely for unrelated nonsigning hearing people to observe signing 
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Deaf people so attentively that they will notice any un-PC language used by the signers in 
their conversation.
Yet, imagine two signing Deaf people, Johann and Thabo, sitting in a park. They are not 
used to seeing members of the Jewish community in their neighbourhood. When an 
Orthodox Jewish family walks by, Johann points to them and uses the hooked nose sign to 
say: “Look! Jews!” The very iconic nature of this sign and the fact that Johann pointed to the 
family to draw Thabo’s attention, makes the sign reasonably obvious to both the family and 
any onlookers whose attention was caught by Johann’s signing. If the hearing nonsigner is 
able to infer the meaning of the iconic sign, then a case could be made against Johann and 
it will be his responsibility to prove that his intentions were not discriminatory.
Of course, it is a different case entirely when one signing Deaf person uses an un-PC sign in 
conversation with another Deaf person. If the receiver experiences the sign as hateful (either 
an arbitrary or iconic sign), then a less complicated hate speech case may present itself.
Effectiveness of the Equality Act and the Hate Speech Bill
How sufficient are the definitions and criteria in the Equality Act and the Hate Speech Bill 
to address hate speech transgressions in sign language? As pointed out earlier, important 
words in the Act are either not defined, or they are defined in the Bill through words that 
need further explanation. As a result, both pieces of legislation are vague and broad, and 
consequently might provide many loopholes. Nevertheless, words and phrases in both the 
Act and the Bill that stand out and may be of concern here, are: causing hurt, promotion of 
hatred, undermining human dignity, perpetuating disadvantages and ridiculing a person 
or groups of persons. This speaks to the reason for the hate speech legislation. Hate speech 
goes beyond mere insult and concerns three main factors:
(1) it identifies and targets a traditionally oppressed group of people;9 
(2) it attributes inferiority to that group; and 
(3) the verbal (or visual) exchange employs hateful and degrading content directed at the 
target group (Janse van Rensburg, 2013:1, 3). 
This corresponds with what Justice Lamont said during the Afriforum v Malema case of 
2011 (par. 102), that the contested words “dehumanised” the group at which they were 
aimed. Whether or not intentions are deliberate, some language outputs may debase the 
addressee, or be potentially damaging to him or her (Teichner, 2003:354).
When one objectively summarises the Act and the Bill, it becomes clear that both pieces 
of legislation try to prevent the above from happening. In doing so, the Act and the Bill 
9 Of course, hate speech is by no means exclusive. Members of the in-group are also victims of hate speech and 
other forms of discrimination.
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provide criteria and a list of qualifying grounds that must be used by a presiding officer in 
a test to determine if hate speech is applicable. Though not perfect, it is safe to say that the 
current and suggested legislation provide enough substance to gauge the contested output, 
verbal and visual alike. The real question should be whether an individual has truly been 
debased by another’s communication. The present criteria (being hurtful or harmful, for 
instance) and the prohibited grounds (gender, religion, refugee status, etc.) are clear enough 
to include different forms of human communication, like spoken and signed language, and 
writing systems such as braille.
Conclusion
Both McGonagle (2011) and Parekh (2012) argue that antidiscrimination legislation seldom 
succeeds in changing the deep-rooted cause(s) of hate speech. Though the intention of 
these laws is to combat discrimination and to encourage citizens to take part actively 
in public life, legislation can easily become a blunt instrument or a means to suppress 
ideas and freedom. The ideal would be to address the causes that lead to hate speech, 
preferably through education. An approach would be for official institutions like religious 
congregations, the media, government, and so on to change their vocabulary deliberately 
and to involve the community in doing so. This is already visible in the world of mental 
health in which words with negative connotations (such as “crazy” and “asylum”) are actively 
replaced with positive synonyms. Another example is the “Find New Words” campaign in 
which rural communities contribute new LGBTI+ identifying words to replace pejoratives 
like isitabane and moffie (Ntsabo, 2018).
Sign language is not new to changing vocabularies. Because sign language is seldom written 
down, there is a greater fluidity in adapting its vocabulary (Aarons & Akach, 1998:2, 24). 
This means that sign language can adapt and change more readily than spoken language. 
Signs are amended to fit both socio-political changes and the needs that arise because of 
them (McKee & McKee, 2011:511-512). When it comes to identity signifiers, the latest 
rule of thumb is to borrow the appropriate signs from the cultures that are being depicted. 
For instance, the official sign used in South African Sign Language for “Africa” has been 
adopted by other countries to refer to the continent and its people and features. It is not 
the purpose of this chapter to prescribe to the Deaf community; nevertheless, it would 
make sense for current standardisation and dictionary projects in South Africa to include 
initiatives that address older identity signifiers and explore why they are problematic.
As for the current legislation, more could be done to address its vagueness. The Equality 
Act should be revised to include clear definitions for “publish”, “propagate”, “advocate” and 
“communicate”. Although the Hate Speech Bill does much better to define what types of 
communication qualify as hate speech, each of the types could do with examples or a brief 
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elaboration. The Bill could also improve its definition of “communication” by saying what 
communication is. Both the Act and the Bill try to cover a wide spectrum of communication 
and its means of dissemination, but the true nature of its vagueness will only become 
known once courts start to deal with non-standard issues, like the use of sign language, 
braille, national symbols like flags, and audio files that do not qualify as oral statements. 
More thought should also be given to the way presiding officers interpret these statutes. 
Courts should consider a semiotic approach, in which the disputed communication is 
viewed from the perspective of a signifier–signified relationship. Alternatively, a contested 
communication can be scrutinised through cognitive semantics, in which the contested 
visual or lexical item(s) are viewed as a container of conceptual meaning. These approaches 
may save presiding officers from becoming entangled in wordy definitions of “hate speech” 
and “communication”.
That being said, a reasonable person’s understanding of what constitutes hate speech, 
depending upon the given criteria (like the prohibited grounds), makes it reasonably clear: 
using discriminatory language, regardless of its spoken or visual form, is unacceptable. Of 
course, if pragmatics has taught us anything, we should know that speakers do not keep 
to the rules and guidelines of language, be they grammar- or convention-based. Directing 
unacceptable identity signifiers (words or signs) at someone else, knowingly or ignorantly, 
will immediately place a legal burden squarely on the transgressor’s shoulders. Hopefully, 
the context of the exchange may count in his or her favour.
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